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Abstract 
Liberals conceive of territorial rights as dependent on the legitimacy of the state, which is in turn 
understood in terms of the state’s protection of individual rights and freedoms. Such justifications 
of territorial rights have difficulties in addressing the right to control immigration, which is 
therefore in need of additional justification. The paper considers Christopher Heath Wellman’s 
liberal proposal for justifying the right to control immigration, which understands the right as 
derivative of a general right to freedom of association held collectively by the people of the state. 
The paper argues that state legitimacy and freedom of political association fail to connect in the way 
required to justify a right to control immigration. Wellman’s argument conflates the state as an 
institution and the people as a political collective and elides the difference between territorial 
jurisdiction and associational freedom. 
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Introduction 
This paper is about the relationship between the territorial rights of states and their right to control 
and limit immigration into their territories. I focus on a broadly liberal conception of territorial 
rights as dependent on the legitimacy of the state, which is in turn understood in terms of the state’s 
protection of individual rights and freedoms. Such justifications of territorial rights are quite 
attractive, but have difficulties in addressing precisely the right to control immigration, which is 
therefore in need of additional justification. I will consider a specific proposal for how the right to 
control immigration can be justified without relying on ideas such as natural property rights or the 
self-determination of pre-political nations. The proposal understands the right to control 
immigration as derivative of a general right to freedom of association held collectively by the 
people of the state. Protection of individual rights and freedom of association are both core liberal 
values. Together they promise to provide a coherent justification of territorial states and the right 
such states are ordinarily thought to have to control immigration. If this justification works, liberals 
can rebut allegations that they are not able to address questions about borders and exclusion without 
either succumbing to radical cosmopolitanism or become parasitic on realist or nationalist 
assumptions.
1
 
Although theoretically and normatively attractive, the liberal conception of territorial 
rights faces difficulties in the case of immigration. My claim is that state legitimacy and freedom of 
political association fail to connect in the way required to justify a right to control immigration. I 
will try to show this with regard to the particular version of the liberal conception presented by 
Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman in their liberal theory of international justice, 
                                                 
1
 For an example of liberalism parasitic on nationalism, see Will Kymlicka, ‘Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal 
Egalitarian Perspective,’ in D. Miller and S.H. Hashmi (eds.), Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 249-275. 
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which is the most comprehensive articulation of this broad kind of view. My diagnosis of the 
problems facing the liberal conception in general, and Altman and Wellman’s position in particular, 
is that it runs together the state as an institution and the people as a political collective and elides the 
difference between territorial jurisdiction and associational freedom.  
While these conflations make things easier for liberals than they really are, my 
purpose is not to argue against either liberalism or any kind of immigration control. In fact, one of 
the points of my discussion is to highlight that Altman and Wellman’s theory exemplifies how the 
discussion of immigration needs to address both territorial rights and other normative issues not 
directly related to territory; both are necessary for any plausible justification of a right to control 
immigration, and each is insufficient on its own. So my positive claim is that the structure of their 
justification is correct; my negative claim merely is that their particular proposal for how the liberal 
legitimacy theory of territorial rights should be complemented by considerations of freedom of 
association fails. In the course of showing this I make a number of theoretical distinctions relevant 
to theories of territorial rights more generally, which might be helpful for alternative attempts to 
formulate justification applicable to immigration. 
 
Territorial Rights 
The territorial rights of states are the rights states have regarding their territory.
2
 This can be 
analyzed as saying that the state is the subject of a right, the object of which involves reference to 
                                                 
2
 While I limit my discussion to the territorial rights of states, I do not for present purposes take a stand on whether 
states are the only entities that can have territorial rights or whether non-state entities, e.g. national groups or the 
peoples of conquered states, might also have. The limitation is due to the fact that I am addressing liberal theories 
attempting to justify territorial rights of states without invoking pre-political territorial rights, such as both nationalist 
and traditional libertarian theories do. A separate reason for doubting whether non-state entities can have territorial 
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the territory. That the state has a right means that other agents are placed under duties or rendered 
morally disabled or liable in certain ways towards the state regarding the object of the right. There 
can then be different kinds of territorial rights depending on what claims or powers the state has and 
how these involve the territory. One, now standard, typology of territorial rights distinguishes 
between property rights, jurisdictional rights, and meta-jurisdictional rights. Property rights are 
rights of ownership over things. Jurisdictional rights are rights to make, adjudicate, and enforce 
rules, both for how property rights should be regulated as well as other kinds of regulations, e.g. 
criminal law or traffic regulations. And meta-jurisdictional rights are rights to determine and change 
jurisdictions.
3
 States may have property rights over parts of their territory, but most of the territorial 
rights of states are not property rights. The main sense of territorial rights of states is jurisdictional. 
This captures a central aspect of a widely accepted Weberian understanding of states as institutions 
claiming a monopoly to the legitimate exercise of violence within a territory, i.e. the idea that a state 
not only regulates relations within a territory in a way backed by coercion, but also claims to be the 
only agency which can do this legitimately. To be a state then centrally involves claiming 
jurisdiction over a territory.
4
 
Here I focus on one right states are commonly assumed to have, which is often listed 
among the territorial rights, since it clearly pertains to territory, namely the right to control 
                                                                                                                                                                  
rights is that they are arguably not able to exercise jurisdictional rights, and their rights regarding territory can therefore 
not be jurisdictional rights. Such groups might still have different kinds of territorial rights, e.g. a right, under suitable 
conditions, to have their own state (or, in the case of conquered states, to have it back). 
3
 Allen Buchanan, ‘The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries: What Liberalism Has to Say,’ in A. Buchanan and M. 
Moore (eds.), States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 231-61; Cara Nine, ‘A Lockean Theory of Territory,’ Political Studies 56:1 (2008): 148-65, p. 150; Anna 
Stilz, ‘Why do States have Territorial Rights?’ International Theory 1:2 (2009): 185–213, p. 195. 
4
 Christopher W. Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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immigration.
5
 Immigration is by definition movement of people into a state (the central case being 
people who move with a view to indefinite residence on its territory), so a right to control 
immigration accordingly involves a right to exclude immigrants from the territory. My question is 
whether and how the right to control immigration might be justified in relation to other territorial 
rights, or on the basis of the justification given for other territorial rights. This question is both 
interesting from the point of view of normative discussions of immigration, and as part of the theory 
of territorial rights and the state. I am not assuming that the discussion of the justification of 
territorial rights is the only relevant perspective on the issue of immigration – there may be other 
relevant considerations, e.g. global distributive justice or human rights. But a territorial rights 
perspective is crucial given the obvious territorial aspects of the issue of immigration: if there is a 
right to control immigration, this must apparently involve or relate to territorial rights, since 
immigration by definition is a matter of movement into a territory. And a theory of territorial rights 
would conversely be incomplete if it did not address the issue of immigration. 
 Even though liberalism is an essentially contested concept and there are many 
conceptions of liberalism, I will for present purposes distinguish between liberal justifications of 
territorial rights and libertarian, e.g. Lockean, theories according to which territorial rights of states 
derive from individual natural property rights in land.
6
 Such libertarian theories are both simple and 
give an immediately understandable explanation for why states have territorial rights: the citizens of 
the state own the land constituting the state’s territory and have somehow delegated the authority to 
                                                 
5
 E.g. A. John Simmons, ‘On the Territorial Rights of States,’ Philosophical Issues 11 (2001): 300-26, p. 306; Michael 
Blake and Mathias Risse, ‘Migration, Territoriality, and Culture,’ in J. Ryberg, T.S. Petersen, and C. Wolf (eds.), New 
Waves in Applied Ethics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 153-181; David Miller, ‘Territorial Rights: 
Concept and Justification,’ forthcoming in Political Studies (references are to the online early view version), p. 2. 
6
 Hillel Steiner, ‘Territorial Justice,’ in S. Caney, D. George, and P. Jones (eds.), National Rights, International 
Obligations (Boulder: Westview, 1996), pp. 139-48; Simmons, ‘On the Territorial Rights of States.’ 
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enforce these property rights to the state. But there are a host of problems facing Lockean theories 
concerning the existence of natural property rights, legitimate acquisition, the rights of others after 
initial acquisition, delegation of enforcement to the state, and the problem that such theories have 
implications that differ radically from ordinary ideas about state authority and legitimacy. Attempts 
have been made to avoid some of these problems by adopting modified collectivist versions of 
Lockean theories, which either conceive of the state as a collective or focus on nations as pre-
political collectives,
7
 where the idea is that such collectives can become entitled to the land in a 
Lockean fashion.
8
 
 
Liberal Legitimacy as a Basis for Territorial Rights 
For present purposes I will not go into substantial discussion of libertarian theories and their 
problems, which I simply note in order to focus on an alternative conception of territorial rights 
                                                 
7
 For the conception of the state as a collective, see Nine, ‘A Lockean Theory of Territory.’ For nationalist versions, see 
Tamar Meisels, Territorial Rights (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005); David Miller, National Responsibility and Global 
Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Miller, ‘Territorial Rights: Concept and Justification.’ 
8
 Another variation over property rights-based theories is the theory proposed by Ryan Pevnick, Immigration and the 
Constraints of Justice: Between Open Borders and Absolute Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), according to which the group of citizens collectively upholding the institutions of the state have ‘associative 
ownership’ over the state and the public goods it produces. This theory is not a libertarian theory in the traditional 
sense, since the property in question is created rather than acquired. Also, the theory does not directly address the issue 
of territorial rights, only ownership over institutions. It therefore seems incomplete as a justification of territorial 
exclusion, as Pevnick notes (Immigration and the Constraints of Justice, p. 56). He nevertheless dismisses this 
objection by stating that ‘there can be little doubt’ that a group upholding institutions has ‘a legitimate claim to its land’ 
(Immigration and the Constraints of Justice, p. 57). But even if true, this seems theoretically unsatisfactory, since the 
theory still does not positively explain why such a group has territorial rights. 
 7 
according to which territorial rights are not materially derivable from pre-political rights but are 
rather a sui generis kind of rights that arise with the state rather than substantially precede it. 
The liberal version of this alternative view claims that a state has territorial rights if it is legitimate.
9
 
Liberal legitimacy in turn does not depend on respect for pre-political natural property rights, but is 
a matter of states being justified in existing and carrying out the characteristic functions of states 
(have ‘a right to rule’) because of the unique kinds of benefits they thereby realize. Territorial 
rights, then, do not derive from pre-political rights over land, but arise together with the particular 
kind of organization of social life that states are. Modern states are characterized by the direct rule 
by an impersonal institutional organization by means of law enforced through a monopoly on 
legitimate violence within a territorially defined jurisdiction. According to the type of liberal theory 
I will consider here, the standard of state legitimacy is a sufficient degree of protection of and 
respect for general basic human rights.
10
 These human rights are not to be understood as pre-
political rights, e.g. as rights that people would have in a state of nature, but as measures of 
legitimacy specially tailored to assess the functioning of this kind of institution. Because human 
rights are in this context understood as measures of legitimacy, they are directed at the state in the 
sense that the primary bearer of the correlative duties is the state; and if the state fails to fulfill these 
duties, it is not legitimate and has no right to rule and hence no territorial rights. 
Liberals are so-called statists when they claim that the state is necessary to avoid the 
insecurity and limitations on liberty of a state-less state of nature, or to provide similar important 
                                                 
9
 Anna Stilz, ‘Nations, States, and Territory,’ Ethics 121: 3 (April 2011): 572-601, provides the most comprehensive 
account of a (Kantian version of) the legitimate state theory of territorial rights. Here I will not go into the details of 
Stilz’s theory, which includes some elements with no obvious counterpart in Altman and Wellman’s theory. 
10
 Buchanan, ‘The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries,’ pp. 153-55; Stilz, ‘Nations, States, and Territory,’ pp. 587-
89. 
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benefits that could not be provided otherwise.
11
 This general justification for having states at all is 
then applied to the specifically territorial aspects of states, i.e. the fact that states claim and exert 
authority over all individuals within a territorially delimited jurisdiction: the upholding of a 
territorial jurisdiction is a basic public good necessary for the protection of individuals and the only 
way of successfully performing the other functions of states.
12
 
 Such justifications for territorial rights can be considered specifically liberal if the 
liberty the state is protecting, or the benefits it is providing, is liberty of or benefits to individuals 
and if territorial rights are only justified insofar as they are necessary for this purpose, which statist 
liberals claim they are. Further conditions are arguably required as well, e.g. that the state secures 
these benefits in a way properly respecting the moral equality of all individuals, which is why the 
measure of legitimacy is cast in terms of respect for individual human rights. The precise 
formulation of this condition is of course a challenge, especially for statist liberals who want to 
distinguish their position from more demanding forms of cosmopolitanism. For the purpose of the 
present paper I will not go into these details, however, but simply take a general liberal legitimacy 
view of territorial rights for granted, for the sake of argument. I therefore bracket wider discussions 
                                                 
11
 This sense of statism is different from another, according to which statism is the view that considerations of justice 
are inapplicable beyond state borders (e.g. Pevnick, Immigration and the Constraints of Justice, pp. 8, 20 – Pevnick 
mentions the view I call statism as “the key point of social contract theory” on p. 68). The two views are independent: 
one might think that states are necessary, but that considerations of justice do apply beyond state borders, and possibly 
also that states are not necessary even though justice only applies within borders. I only discuss statism in the sense 
concerning the justification of states, not the sense concerning the scope of justice. 
12
 Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘Samaritanism and the Duty to Obey the Law,’ in A.J. Simmons and C.H. Wellman, Is 
there a Duty to Obey the Law? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 3-89; Christopher Heath Wellman, 
A Theory of Secession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 14-15; Stilz, ‘Why do States have 
Territorial Rights?’ 
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of the implications of liberalism, e.g. for global distributive justice. Even though this type of 
account of territorial rights is not without its problems, I will not argue for this point of departure. 
My aim is rather to explore some internal difficulties that arise for proponents of this type of 
position when they want to extend it to the important issue of immigration, which is precisely what 
Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman attempt to do.
13
 I use their particular theory to 
draw out some general theoretical and normative points. My theoretical points concern the concepts 
used in discussing these issues, especially ‘territorial rights,’ ‘self-determination,’ ‘state,’ and 
‘people.’ My normative points concern some difficulties in justifying a right of a state to control 
immigration in relation to its territorial rights that emerge once we appreciate the relationship 
between the theoretical concepts. 
 Altman and Wellman’s liberal theory of international justice is liberal in virtue of two 
features: a) it is based on value individualism, i.e. the axiological view that the well-being of 
individuals is the only thing that ultimately matters morally,
14
 and b) on human rights as both 
constraints on the exercise of state power and the conditions, respect for which, is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for state legitimacy and hence for state’s having a right to self-determination.15 
Altman and Wellman distinguish their liberal theory from both nationalist theories, according to 
which legitimate states have to constitute pre-politically (e.g. culturally) defined ‘nations’ and 
institutional forms of cosmopolitanism, according to which states have no right to self-
determination and should ideally be replaced by global political institutions.  
                                                 
13
 Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
14
 Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, pp. 5, 37-41. 
15
 Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, pp. 2-5 
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 While they do not formulate their theory in these terms, I interpret Altman and 
Wellman’s theory as incorporating a liberal legitimacy theory of territorial rights. They take their 
point of departure in the common Weberian conception of the state as a political organization that 
‘employ[s] coercion and, more generally, exercise[s] ultimate decision-making power over a 
territorially based population on a wide range of matters.’16 The central question about states thus 
understood is whether they enjoy the bundle of rights traditionally referred to as sovereignty. 
Sovereignty rights can, according to Altman and Wellman, be understood as tied together by an 
abstract right of the state to self-determination. Both sovereignty and self-determination involve 
territorial aspects since they concern the rights of the state to exist and to make, adjudicate, and 
enforce law within the territory. The central question, then, is when a state has the right to self-
determination. Altman and Wellman propose the simple liberal answer that:  
 
Legitimacy rests on the ability and willingness of a state to adequately protect the 
human rights of its constituents and to respect the rights of all others. If a state 
adequately protects and respects human rights … it successfully carries out the 
“requisite political functions.” That is, the state is doing the job that it needs to do in 
order to justify its coercive power and thereby be legitimate.
17
  
                                                 
16
 Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, p. 3. 
17
 Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, p. 3. Wellman also relies on similar formulations 
elsewhere, e.g. on p. 16 in Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘In Defense of the Right to Exclude,’ in P. Cole and C.H. 
Wellman, Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is there a Right to Exclude? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
pp. 13-56. On p. 102, note 10, in ‘The Democratic Case for Open Borders,’ in P. Cole and C.H. Wellman, Debating the 
Ethics of Immigration: Is there a Right to Exclude? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 93-103, Wellman 
explicitly connects state legitimacy to territorial rights: ‘other things being equal, those who occupy a territory enjoy 
jurisdictional rights over this land as long as they are able and willing to perform the requisite political functions.’ 
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So if a state performs the ‘requisite political functions’ in terms of human rights protection, then it 
is legitimate. Altman and Wellman then add that:  
 
only a legitimate state has a moral right of self-determination. Moreover, we hold that 
this right is irreducible to the individual rights of the constituents of the state. The 
right is a group right: it belongs to the members of the state as a collective body, 
because it can only be exercised jointly by its members.
18
 
 
These are substantial normative claims, since Altman and Wellman understand the status of 
legitimacy and the accompanying collective right of self-determination not only as Hohfeldian 
liberty rights to rule, but also as Hohfeldian claim rights that ‘other agents have a duty to respect the 
decisions made in the exercise of that power,’19 which binds both members subjected to the internal 
authority of the state and foreign persons and powers. 
 
Immigration and Territorial Rights  
Even if one accepts a general liberal legitimacy theory of territorial rights according to which 
adequate protection of and respect for human rights renders a state legitimate, which gives the state 
the territorial right to make, adjudicate, and enforce law within its territory, it is still problematic to 
extend this territorial right to a right to control immigration: 
The problem is that the two rights are conceptually different in a way which arguably 
also makes them normatively different in the sense that what suffices as a justification for the 
                                                 
18
 Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, p. 4. 
19
 Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, p. 3. 
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former right may not adequately justify the latter.
20
 This difference is denied by some theorists. 
David Miller, for instance, writes that the authority of a state over any particular piece of land must 
include the right to require immigrants to leave ‘since a system of territorial authority cannot 
function without some control over who falls within its scope.’21 But this is a contingent empirical 
question the answer to which is not as clear as Miller takes it to be. If the function of political 
authority is to uphold law and order within a territory in a way protecting and respecting human 
rights, nothing in this political function or its justification necessarily requires the right to control 
immigration and exclude unwanted immigrants. Political authority thus understood and justified is 
compatible with the state not having a right to control immigration; the other powers of sovereignty 
are not necessarily undermined or rendered void if the state does not have the right to control 
immigration. It is of course true that immigration might be so massive that it would severely burden 
the receiving society and undermine the ability of the state to perform the requisite political 
functions. But this is a contingent matter that cannot justify a general right to control immigration 
also in cases where there is no prospect of such consequences.
22
 So I am not saying that there are no 
good reasons for controlling immigration to states. My point is that a right to control immigration to 
the territory of the state is distinct from and does not follow from the state’s jurisdictional rights 
within the territory. Additional argument is needed in order to justify such a general right. 
What does it mean to speak about a ‘general’ right and why does it matter for present 
purposes whether the right to exclude immigration is general? The distinction is between whether 
there is a right to exclude immigrants in all cases or only in a more circumscribed number of cases. 
This generality/specificity distinction is separate from another distinction, namely the distinction 
                                                 
20
 Sune Lægaard, ‘What is the Right to Exclude Immigrants?’ Res Publica 16:3 (October 2010): 245–262. 
21
 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, pp. 215-16. 
22
 Cf. Sarah Fine, ‘Freedom of Association Is Not the Answer,’ Ethics 120 (2010): 338–356, p. 355. 
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between whether a right is absolute and unconstrained or pro tanto and subject to being overridden 
by other considerations. There are arguably no rights that are absolute and completely 
unconstrained; the state cannot exercise any rights in complete disregard of other normative 
considerations or the possible consequences. But there are general pro tanto rights, which means 
that the state may have rights that hold in all cases, but which are constrained or subject to being 
overridden by other normative considerations. The general right to self-determination defended by 
Altman and Wellman is general but constrained, since their point precisely is that legitimate states 
enjoy sovereignty over all self-regarding matters, but that the resulting right to freedom of 
association is merely ‘presumptive.’23 The debate over a right to exclude immigrants concerns the 
question whether there is a general pro tanto right to control immigration, not whether states can 
legitimately control immigration in specific cases, which could be justified without relying on such 
a right. 
Returning to the conceptual and normative distinctness of territorial rights and a right 
to control immigration, Altman and Wellman are apparently well aware of the need to provide a 
separate justification for the right to control immigration. Their proposal is that the right to control 
immigration is a corollary of a more general right to freedom of association, which all legitimate 
states enjoy in virtue of their right to self-determination. Wellman has elsewhere formulated their 
argument simply as follows: 
 
This type of argument involves three basic premises (1) legitimate states have a right 
to political self-determination, (2) freedom of association is an essential component of 
                                                 
23
 Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, pp. 160-61, 162, 165, cf. Christopher Heath 
Wellman, ‘Immigration and Freedom of Association,’ Ethics 119 (2008): 109–41, pp. 111, 113-14, 117. 
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self-determination, and (3) freedom of association entitles one to refuse to associate 
with others.
24
 
 
The conclusion is that ‘a legitimate state's right to freedom of association entitles it to choose 
whether or not to admit any given immigrants.’ The question then is 1) why one should accept the 
three premises, and 2) whether the conclusion that legitimate states have a right to control 
immigration follows from these premises? 
 The first premise is a basic building block of Altman and Wellman’s liberal theory. It 
is not specific to the issue of immigration but general; it both explains the value of democratic 
governance, the existence of a primary right to secession for groups able and willing to constitute 
legitimate states, and is crucial to whether military interventions are permissible. It is also expressed 
in their liberal legitimacy theory of territorial rights. Since the present paper is an internal critique 
of their argument regarding immigration, I will simply accept the first premise in the form needed 
to justify these other elements of Altman and Wellman’s theory for the purpose of my argument. 
 The second and third premises are supported through what might be called a 
‘reflective equilibrium’ argument, namely that they are necessary to answer the so-called 
particularity problem. The particularity problem is that even if adequate protection of and respect 
for human rights justifies political authority over a territory, this justification does not in itself 
explain why a particular state should have this authority rather than another state that could fulfill 
                                                 
24
 Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘Immigration,’ in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2010 Edition), sect. 1.6, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/immigration/ A similar 
formulation is found in Wellman, ‘In Defense of the Right to Exclude,’ p. 13. 
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the requisite political functions equally well.
25
 The particularity problem for legitimacy theories is 
dramatized by the annexation objection: 
 
Imagine, for instance, that a series of plebiscites revealed both that an overwhelming 
majority of Americans wanted to merge with Canada and that an equally high 
proportion of Canadians preferred to maintain their independence. Would it be 
permissible for the United States to forcibly annex Canada... if the United States could 
execute this unilateral merger without disrupting the peace or violating the individual 
rights of any Canadians[?]
26
 
 
The point of the objection is that the liberal legitimacy view of territorial rights apparently cannot 
explain what is intuitively wrong in such cases of annexation, since human rights are not violated in 
the annexation process. So a pure legitimacy theory focusing only on respect for human rights of 
individuals is inadequate to address annexation cases. What is missing is, according to Altman and 
Wellman, a right of political communities as collectives: 
 
The crucial point for our purposes is that one cannot explain the wrongness of 
unilateral annexations such as this unless one supposes that countries like Canada 
                                                 
25
 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 158. 
26
 Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, p. 161, cf. Christopher Heath Wellman, 
‘Immigration and Freedom of Association,’ Ethics 119 (2008): 109–41, p. 112, and Wellman, ‘ In Defense of the Right 
to Exclude,’ pp. 21-22. See also Stilz, ‘Why do states have territorial rights?’ p. 206, and Stilz, ‘Nations, States, and 
Territory,’ pp. 590-91. 
 16 
enjoy a right to self-determination that includes the right of Canadians, as a political 
community, to associate with others as they see fit.
27
 
 
This right to freedom of association is not necessarily final and absolute, since there may be other 
competing considerations that outweigh it in some circumstances. But a presumptive right to 
freedom of association is sufficient to answer the annexation objection. 
Altman and Wellman additionally support the ascription of a right to freedom of 
association to states by arguments from analogy and by suggesting that there is a plausible 
theoretical rationale for it. They argue for states’ freedom of association by analogy to other forms 
of association, e.g. marriage and voluntary associations. Furthermore, ‘Freedom of association is 
not something that requires an elaborate justification ... since it is simply one component of the self-
determination which is owed to all individuals and legitimate states.’28 The right is a reasonable 
corollary of the normative status of legitimacy in the sense that it is natural to ascribe such a right to 
an entity which has the status of legitimacy. So the right of states to freedom of association needed 
to answer the annexation objection can be derived from, or is simply a component of, a more 
fundamental collective right to self-determination of legitimate states, which according to Altman 
and Wellman enjoys independent intuitive and theoretical plausibility. The right to exclude is 
finally a natural and necessary corollary of freedom of association, since the latter would not have 
the value we generally think it has without this right. 
 
                                                 
27
 Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, p. 161; cf. Wellman, ‘Immigration and Freedom of 
Association,’ pp. 112-13. 
28
 Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, p.: 162, cf. ‘Immigration and Freedom of 
Association,’ p. 114. 
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Problems for the Freedom of Association Argument 
There are a number of possible criticisms of Altman and Wellman’s freedom of association 
argument. Two have already been prominently formulated in the literature: 1) a rejection of 
freedom of association as relevant in relation to states, and 2) a rejection of the right to exclude as 
being sufficiently unconstrained in relation to immigration. David Miller has for instance pointed 
out that freedom of association derives its importance from a deep interest in not being forced into 
association with others against our wishes, but that this interest has much less, if any, weight in the 
case of large, anonymous political communities such as states.
29
 Sarah Fine has marshalled a range 
of objections, one being that freedom of association is restricted to ‘self-regarding’ affairs, which 
exclusion of immigrants is not, since it may harm outsiders.
30
 The force of these objections is to 
undermine the analogy between states and other associations and to diminish the general scope and 
strength of freedom of association. 
Altman and Wellman might have answers to these objections. Even though a state is 
not a voluntary or intimate association, it is a very important association, which members 
reasonably care about.
31
 Altman and Wellman might fall back on freedom of association as 
necessary for answering the annexation objection. Miller would here counter that this can be 
explained in nationalist terms, so this answer would boil down to whether or not liberals can accept 
nationalism, which it is precisely Altman and Wellman’s aim to deny. Fine’s claim that states may 
harm immigrants if it ‘wrongly causes them to be worse off than they would be otherwise’32 simply 
begs the question against Altman and Wellman, since exclusion is not wrongful if the state has a 
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right to exclude. If the wrongness is explained in terms of a comparison with members of the state, 
then the criticism presupposes some form of global egalitarianism, which Altman and Wellman 
reject, and therefore Fine’s objection is not an internal criticism, as she claims. But even if we grant 
these objections, legitimate states might still have a pro tanto right to freedom of association, which 
is merely more easily overridden and more circumscribed than Altman and Wellman think. 
 I want to present a different criticism, which mainly trades on the theoretical concepts 
used in formulating the argument. It is therefore both independent of the intuitive disagreements 
between Miller, Fine, and Altman and Wellman, and of broader relevance. There are two parts to 
my criticism. The first is to question the move from a right of self-determination for legitimate 
states to a right to freedom of association understood in the way Altman and Wellman do for the 
purpose of their argument about immigration. The second is to argue that even if one grants a right 
to freedom of association, it does not follow from this that legitimate states have even a pro tanto 
right to control immigration. 
 
Legitimacy as a Ground for Self-Determination 
A central part of Altman and Wellman’s rationale for why states have a right to freedom of 
association is that legitimacy grounds a right to self-determination. What does this mean and is it 
plausible? In relation to states, self-determination traditionally means that other states are bound by 
duties of non-intervention. If a state is indeed legitimate, then this seems plausible, since 
intervention would minimally require justification in terms of a need to protect human rights.
33
 
But Altman and Wellman take self-determination to mean more than a right to non-
intervention. Self-determination only implies the right to freedom of association needed to justify a 
right to control immigration if it also includes the right to determine what the “self” in question is: 
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Because the members of a group can change, an important part of group self-
determination is having control over what the “self” is. In other words, unlike 
individual self-determination, a significant component of group self-determination is 
having control over the group which in turn gets to be self-determining.
34
 
 
So self-determination is not a purely external matter, but also an internal matter, and not only a right 
of the state vis-a-vis other states, but a right over its own people as well. Rights over the people are 
well-known from the doctrine of popular sovereignty, according to which the people have a right to 
rule over themselves (this right is reflective in the sense that its subject and object are identical). 
Altman and Wellman also subscribe to a version of this view, since their central principle is that any 
group able and willing to constitute a legitimate state has a collective right to self-determination, 
which among other things explains the intrinsic value of democratic rule.
35
 Only legitimate states 
can appeal to such a right, since a main reason for denying a right to rule is that the rule fails to 
represent the people. The connection between legitimacy as protection of individual human rights 
and the collective right to self-rule is weaker than that between legitimacy and the right to non-
intervention, however, since Altman and Wellman reject reduction of collective self-rule to 
individual autonomy.
36
 Liberal legitimacy is only concerned with human rights as necessary 
constraints on political rule, not necessarily with democracy, so there is not an immediate rationale 
for a collective right to self-rule based on legitimacy. 
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But Altman and Wellman’s understanding of self-determination takes a radical step 
beyond self-rule: as expressed in the above quote, it not only concerns a people’s right to rule over 
themselves but the people’s right to determine the composition of its ‘self.’ There are three things to 
say about this: First, this is a completely different sense of self-determination than non-intervention 
and collective self-rule; the objects of and rights incidents involved in the three rights to self-
determination are different. Non-intervention is a negative claim right obliging other states not to 
interfere. Self-rule is a liberty, positive claim right and power to make, adjudicate, and enforce law 
within a territorial jurisdiction, which obliges individuals within the jurisdiction to obey the law, 
and makes the collective immune from competing authorities. Self-composition is apparently a 
liberty, positive claim right, and power to determine who are members of the people, which 
apparently, although this is unclear from Altman and Wellman’s formulation, not only can grant 
them the status of membership but also oblige individuals in this respect. The question is whether 
there is reason to accept such a new sense of self-determination. 
Recall that Altman and Wellman support their principle of collective self-
determination by its capacity to explain why unilateral annexation is wrong. This is a strong 
intuition, but the sense of self-determination as self-composition is not necessary to explain this. 
Self-determination as non-intervention will amply do the trick. The right to self-determination is 
also supported by its role in explaining the value of democracy, but what is required for this purpose 
is only self-determination as self-rule, not as self-composition. Altman and Wellman do, of course, 
give other examples to support the claim that a right to freedom of association is an important part 
of self-determination for both individuals and groups, e.g. in cases of marriage and golf club 
membership.
37
 But the question, especially in light of Miller’s criticism noted above, precisely is 
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whether the uncontroversial value of freedom of association at the individual and civil associational 
levels extends to states. This is what has to be shown, and this is why Altman and Wellman need 
the annexation case. My point is that at the state level, the independent intuitive support for a 
collective right of self-determination supports only non-intervention and self-rule, not self-
composition; one is not given any reason at all to accept self-determination as self-composition 
even if one accepts all the intuitions about annexation, the value of democracy, etc. which Altman 
and Wellman invoke to support it. What they are doing here is actually introducing a completely 
new notion of self-determination rather than just articulating the already existing implications of an 
already established notion. And this new principle of self-determination as self-composition is not 
supported at all through the reflective equilibrium arguments at the state level. 
There might of course still be other reasons to accept a collective right to self-
determination as self-composition. My second point is that this new principle is much less intuitive 
than the other senses of self-determination and that we therefore do not have any good reason to 
accept a general collective right to self-composition. The idea that a state, as a collective, has the 
right to determine its membership, if understood as a general right in the sense noted earlier, not 
only implies a right to control immigration. Immigration is not the primary or most important 
source of reproduction of the collective; it is mainly reproduced by existing members giving birth to 
children who usually become members of the people automatically. If the existing collective has a 
right to control what it is going to be in the future, this not only means that it can exclude would-be 
immigrants, but also that it can direct its reproduction through birth. This can be done a) 
quantitatively, by regulating the number of children existing members are permitted or required to 
have, and b) qualitatively, by selecting which children existing members are permitted or required 
to have. Such policies are extremely invasive and illiberal. An example of the former is a policy like 
China’s one-child rule, which some already consider problematic. But a general collective right to 
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control the composition of the collective ‘self’ – a right which Altman and Wellman acknowledge 
takes precedence over individual rights
38
 – would also justify policies like those adopted by the 
Third Reich, including bans on racially mixed offspring, coercive abortions of unwanted children, 
sterilizations of unwanted parents, state regulated breeding programs, etc. 
Since the right to self-determination as self-composition is independent of the self-
determination as non-intervention and self-rule, and therefore a separate principle, the plausibility 
of self-composition has to be assessed on its own and on the basis of the implications of such a 
right. As shown above, some of the implications are radically counterintuitive because a general 
right to collective self-composition would seem to justify unacceptable forms of population control. 
Altman and Wellman might reply, however, that the counterintuitive implications can 
be avoided by constraining the right properly. They take the right to self-determination to be 
conditional: only legitimate states that respect human rights have the right in the first place. So if 
state interference in the reproductive choices of citizens is a human rights violation,
39
 Altman and 
Wellman can avoid this implication. 
But then the third thing to note concerning Altman and Wellman’s notion of self-
determination as self-composition is that the supportive relationship between legitimacy and self-
determination in this sense is missing. Where legitimacy naturally and plausibly grounds a right to 
non-intervention, it is elusive why the fact that a state protects and respects human rights should 
give the people of the state the right to control its own composition. There is no material connection 
between legitimacy and composition that makes such a link plausible. This was also the case for 
self-determination as self-rule, but in the case of self-determination as self-composition the problem 
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is worse: the fact that a right to control composition violates human rights unless constrained shows 
that not only is such a right not derivable from a concern with human rights; it directly contradicts 
human rights. So my objection here is that Altman and Wellman’s rationale for the right to freedom 
of association in terms of its connection through self-determination to legitimacy is implausible. 
It might be objected that even though not all means of population control are 
legitimate, the aim of limiting the population surely is legitimate under certain conditions, e.g. the 
threat of over-population, and that this supports a collective right to self-composition. I have two 
answers to this objection: First, many legitimate forms of population policy do not require a right to 
self-composition, which as I noted above involves claim rights against members of the people, since 
they can often be effectively pursued by states in ways not involving the imposition of duties on 
members of the population to have or not have children – economic incentives might for instance be 
effective without violating human rights. Secondly, even if it is justified in special cases to require 
people not to reproduce, e.g. because of catastrophic consequences of unregulated reproduction, this 
is not equivalent to there being a general collective right to self-composition. Such a right would 
give the state a pro tanto right to impose duties on people regarding reproduction in all cases. That 
it is justified to impose such duties in special cases neither shows that there is a pro tanto right to do 
so in other cases, nor is such a general right necessary to justify the special cases, since they might 
be justified on other, e.g. consequentialist, grounds. 
To summarize: The notion of self-determination as a general right to self-composition 
needed in Altman and Wellman’s argument for a right to control immigration is different from self-
determination as non-intervention and as self-rule. Therefore it is not supported by the reflective 
equilibrium arguments justifying the other rights. And considered as an independent principle, it is 
counterintuitive and unnecessary. Even as constrained by human rights, there is therefore no reason 
to accept this independent principle. 
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States have Territorial Rights, Peoples have Freedom of Association 
The second part of my criticism can be presented on the basis of another problem noted by Fine. 
She points out that the argument for a right to control immigration based on freedom of association 
presupposes territorial rights: ‘the citizens of a state are not entitled to stop noncitizens from settling 
there, despite their claim to control access to membership, without a further entitlement to control 
access to the territory in the first place.’40 This is of course entirely true. But when viewed in the 
context of Altman and Wellman’s broader theory as presented above, they have an answer to this 
objection which apparently retains a coherent unity in their position, since their theory incorporates 
a liberal legitimacy theory of territorial rights. If it is true that legitimacy both grounds territorial 
rights and the right to freedom of association of states, then Fine’s objection is answered. 
My second objection now is that, irrespective of my first objection to self-
determination as self-composition, it still does not follow from the fact that the state has 1) 
territorial rights, and 2) a right to freedom of association, that 3) it has a right to control 
immigration. To see why, consider more carefully what kinds of rights we are dealing with and who 
the rights-holders are. Altman and Wellman are in fact not very clear about who the holder of the 
rights in question is. The rights-holder might either be the state as an institution or the people as a 
political collective.
41
 Altman and Wellman often go from one answer to the other within the space 
of two sentences, e.g.: 
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As long as a state adequately protects and respects human rights, it possesses such a 
right of self-determination. Moreover, we contend that this right of self-determination 
is irreducibly collective and so held by the group of persons who constitute the state.
42
 
 
Here it seems that the state and the people are simply considered as one and the same.
43
 But this is 
hardly a correct characterization. The state is an institution (a set of rules defining roles with 
specific rights) with a specific mode of functioning (promulgation of laws within a territorially 
defined jurisdiction backed by a claim for a monopoly on legitimate violence). As such the state is 
distinct both from the persons who staff it (officials) and direct it (judges, members of parliament, 
and government) as well as those who are regularly subjected to it and provide its legitimation 
(citizens). 
If the state and the people are distinct entities, which one is the holder of the rights in 
question? Altman and Wellman elsewhere remark that: 
 
This right of self-determination ... inheres not in governmental institutions, much less 
in the officials who occupy these institutions. Rather, it inheres in a political society as 
a whole. Institutions are the means through which protection of human rights is 
provided and made secure by society.
44
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This seems plausible, but it is too imprecise. One reason is that ‘political society’ is completely 
vague. Another reason is that the general right to self-determination is not the right directly 
implicated in the argument for a right to control immigration; rather, the relevant rights are the 
territorial rights and the right to freedom of association. The question is who the holders of these 
specific derivate or component rights are? 
It seems that the right to freedom of association must be held by the people, at least 
insofar as the association in question is with other persons (citizens or immigrants), as opposed to 
other states, for only people can associate. The association in question is that of becoming a 
member of a group of persons, and only persons and groups of persons can do this; institutions 
cannot. To take an analogous example: even if the people affiliated to an institution such as a 
university have freedom of association to form clubs and fraternities, it would not make sense to say 
that it is the university as such that is the holder of the right to associate, because the university 
cannot be a member of a university club or fraternity. So even if staffs and students of the university 
only have the right to freely form associations within the university because they are affiliated to the 
institution, it is the members of the group of affiliates who have this right, not the institution.  
On the other hand, if the territorial rights are jurisdictional rights to make, adjudicate, 
and enforce law, it seems that only the state can have such rights.
45
 Recall that the liberal argument 
for territorial rights is that a state, understood as an artificial agent making, adjudicating and 
enforcing law within a territorially defined jurisdiction, is necessary to protect the liberty and rights 
of individuals.
46
 If the state is indeed necessary for this purpose and if territorial rights are simply 
the rights to perform these requisite political functions, then only the state can have these rights. Not 
only is the state not identical to the people; the state also functions in ways which the group of 
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citizens cannot do on their own. So even if the reason for having a state, and thus for ascribing the 
state territorial rights, makes reference to the liberty and rights of the people of the state, it must be 
the state, not the people, which is the holder of the territorial rights. Analogously, even if the point 
of having universities is exhausted by the activities of the staffs and students made possible by such 
institutions, the staffs, and students cannot make decisions and act on behalf of the institution if this 
does not happen through the correct institutional mechanisms. 
One objection here might be that, if a state is an institution in the sense of a public 
system of rules defining specific positions and mechanisms, an institution in this sense simply 
cannot be the subject of rights. Moral rights must somehow be held by persons, since only persons 
have intrinsic moral status. This might be a reason for either vesting the rights in question in the 
people of the state, the interests of whom the state is in any event justified as protecting, or to 
identify the state with the collective body of citizens rather than with a system of rules. But even if 
the objection correctly points out that the justification of rights can only appeal to the interests of 
individual persons, it does not follow from this that only individual persons can have rights. Rights 
are ways of protecting interests of individuals or respecting individuals and of formulating what 
such protection and respect requires. But such protection or respect can be cashed out in rights 
assigned to entities that are not individual persons. This is not controversial. Think for instance of 
the rights of contract of corporations: even though a private company is an artificial entity, we are 
perfectly used to ascribing such entities legal rights, and at least some of these rights arguably 
reflect moral rights, which, although the entity itself is not a subject of intrinsic moral respect and 
concern, are moral rights because they can be justified as a way of protecting and respecting 
individuals, e.g. the stakeholders of the corporation. But even though the moral justification for the 
rights must refer to the interests of individual persons, this does not mean that the individual 
stakeholders of a corporation are the holders of the rights of the corporation. Only the corporation 
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as an institutional entity can exercise these rights. And analogously: only the state can exercise the 
jurisdictional rights the performance of which not only provides the justification for having the 
state, but for which, according to the liberal statist argument, the state is necessary. 
 So we have three distinctions: 1) contrary to what Altman and Wellman’s somewhat 
casual formulations suggest, the state and the people are not identical; 2) jurisdictional rights are 
territorial whereas the right to freedom of association is not, and 3) territorial rights are held by the 
state whereas the right to freedom of association is held by the people. Consider now again Altman 
and Wellman’s argument for a right to control immigration supplemented so as to answer Fine’s 
objection: 
 
(1) Legitimate states have a right to political self-determination 
(2) Freedom of association is an essential component of self-determination 
(3) Freedom of association entitles one to refuse to associate with others 
(4) Legitimate states also have territorial rights over their territories 
(5) Therefore legitimate states have a right to control immigration to their territories 
 
If my three distinctions hold, the territorial rights of states (4) and the right to freedom of 
association (2, 3) are not rights held by the same agent or entity. Therefore one cannot conclude (5) 
on the basis of (1-4); it does not follow from the premise that the people have a right to freedom of 
association, that the state has a right to control immigration, even if the state also enjoys territorial 
rights. There is a justification for excluding immigrants, to be sure, which refers to the freedom of 
association that I here for the sake of argument assume the people have. But this right is only a right 
of the people not to associate and at most grounds a duty on others not to impose themselves on the 
association. But it does not follow from this that the state has a right to exclude unwanted 
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immigrants from the territory, for two reasons: first, the people holding the right to freedom of 
association cannot perform the territorial exclusion, and secondly, freedom of association only 
justifies associational exclusion. The state, on the other hand, could perform the territorial 
exclusion, but it is not justified in doing so, since it only holds territorial rights which do not imply 
a right to exclude immigrants.47 
 One might grant my distinction between rights-holders and types of rights but 
nevertheless object to my claim that the right to exclude does not follow from Altman and 
Wellman’s argument. Even if the right to freedom of association is held by the people and territorial 
rights are held by the state, it is after all the people who are supposed to be in control of the state 
and the state is supposed to represent the people. So why can the state not perform the territorial 
exclusion on behalf of the people? To take an analogous example: university affiliates have freedom 
of association, which includes the freedom to disassociate, and the university has the right to make 
and apply rules within the university premises. If a group of university scholars conduct a seminar 
on the university premises and uninvited outsiders barge in, the scholars can call on the university 
to exclude the intruders from the seminar room. Even if the scholars as individuals and as a seminar 
group do not have the right to exclude intruders from university premises, the university can be 
called upon to perform the physical exclusion required to uphold the freedom of association of the 
seminar group. If the analogy holds, why can the state not similarly exclude immigrants to uphold 
the freedom of association of the people? 
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 My reply to the objection is that the analogy does not hold in one crucial respect: the 
whole point of Altman and Wellman’s argument is to provide a justification for the right of states to 
exclude immigrants. Since the right to exclude from the territory is what has to be justified, it 
cannot be taken for granted. But in the university example, it is taken for granted that the university 
has the right to exclude unwanted people obstructing university activities from its premises. So in 
effect the university is assumed to have not only what is analogous to territorial rights, but also what 
is analogous to the right to exclude immigrants, which was what had to be established. So my 
criticism still stands: the right to exclude immigrants does not follow from Altman and Wellman’s 
argument. 
 My criticism might be countered by arguing that the distinction between state and 
people is a mere conceptual distinction without any normative import, because the rights held by the 
state are really the rights of the people. The state is not a person and does not have non-instrumental 
value, and therefore it cannot be the holder of rights. But, as already noted, this challenge to the 
normative salience of my distinction elides two questions: One is who the holder of the right in 
question is; the other is what the justification for the right is. As argued above, the state must be the 
holder of territorial rights, for otherwise the liberal statist justification of state legitimacy collapses. 
But the justification of territorial rights only treats the state as a (necessary) means to secure the 
rights of individuals. So the state has no moral standing independently of the people; it is a 
construct with purely instrumental value. According to Altman and Wellman, if the state’s right of 
self-determination is violated:  
 
it would not be the state that is wronged. It would be inconsistent with value 
individualism to posit that the state is the wronged party, because the state is not an 
individual whose well-being or life ultimately matters morally. Rather, the individual 
 31 
members of the state are the ones whose lives matter, and they are the ones who 
would be wronged. It is the wrong to them that requires respect for the self-
determination of their state
48
 
 
Because the duties of non-interference corresponding to the right of self-determination are duties 
towards legitimate states, it is legitimate states that are the holders of rights of self-determination.  
 To see my point in a different way, recall that Altman and Wellman presented 
freedom of association as justified because it provides an answer to the particularity problem. The 
problem, dramatized by the annexation objection, was that even if a state adequately protects human 
rights, this is not in itself a reason why this state rather than another should hold territorial rights 
over a specific area. Freedom of association works as an answer to the annexation objection because 
a state annexing another is forcing the citizens of the annexed state into an association with its own 
citizens, which violates their right to freedom of association. The problem is that immigration is 
crucially different from annexation. Immigration is a matter of individuals taking up residence 
within the territory of a state, whereas annexation is a matter of one state taking over another, 
subjecting its people to its own authority and including the latter’s territory in its jurisdiction. There 
are several dis-analogies: 1) Immigration is an individual phenomenon, whereas annexation is 
collective and institutional; 2) annexation involves a change in jurisdiction (it is a unilateral 
exercise of meta-jurisdictive power), whereas immigration does not (it involves acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the receiving state), and 3) annexation is a breach of freedom of association because 
the people of the annexed state are forcibly incorporated into the people of the annexing state, 
whereas immigration in itself only involves granting residence permission. These dis-analogies 
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show that even if freedom of association is necessary to answer the annexation objection, it does not 
for that reason apply to the issue of immigration. 
 There are of course ways to challenge this conceptual separation of immigration and 
association. One is to invoke the principle that all persons regularly subjected to the political power 
of a state should also have status as citizens with equal rights. This (at least) implies that permanent 
residents within a state should have a real opportunity to become citizens of that state. Altman and 
Wellman affirm such a principle as one requirement of liberal legitimacy.
49
 On this basis one might 
argue that since peoples have freedom of association as citizen collectives, and since permanently 
admitted immigrants have a right to become full citizens as a requirement of legitimacy then the 
right of the people not to associate extends to the admittance of immigrants to the territory. States 
must have a right to control immigration because this is the only way the requirement of legitimacy 
and freedom of association can be fulfilled together.
50
 
But this argument is not conclusive. If (the possibility for eventual) access to 
citizenship for all permanent residents is indeed a requirement of legitimacy, then only states that 
fulfill this requirement have the right to self-determination, according to Altman and Wellman’s 
theory. So the legitimacy requirement is both logically and normatively primary. One way to escape 
the conclusion of the argument would be, as I did above, to deny that self-determination includes a 
right to determine the future composition of the people. There is no positive rationale connecting 
freedom of association to territorial exclusion (cf. my distinction between the two), and we have no 
reason to accept the sense of self-determination as self-composition grounding freedom of 
                                                 
49
 Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, p. 172; Wellman, ‘Immigration and Freedom of 
Association,’ p. 131. 
50
 Fine, ‘Freedom of Association Is Not the Answer,’ pp. 343-44. 
 33 
association. One might of course also deny that the relevant unit of legitimacy is the state.
51
 But one 
need not invoke such strong cosmopolitan premises in order to deflect the argument; the fact that 
there is no reason to accept one of the premises is sufficient. 
 
Conclusion 
At the normative level the paper has been primarily a negative argument pointing out what I take to 
be some failures in a specific argumentative strategy for justifying a right to exclude immigrants on 
the basis of the territorial rights of states. Even though I have presented this argument as a criticism 
of Altman and Wellman’s theory, I believe that it is of wider relevance, and it is furthermore not 
intended as a rejection of their general liberal position on legitimacy and territorial rights. At a more 
general theoretical level, the paper is not only negative and critical. One general lesson of my 
discussion is that Altman and Wellman’s liberal theory in fact has the right structure to address the 
problem. Immigration is by its very nature a territorial issue, so an account of territorial rights is 
necessary to mount any justification for a right to control immigration. But the right to exclude 
immigrants does not in itself follow from a right to territorial jurisdiction. I have shown that Altman 
and Wellman implicitly acknowledge both of these points. My point has been to make it explicit 
that an account of territorial rights of jurisdiction is necessary but not sufficient for a justification of 
a right to exclude immigrants. I have then further argued that Altman and Wellman’s substantial 
proposal for the additional justification fails. In doing this I have analyzed and elucidated some of 
the central concepts used when discussing these issues. There is much complexity here which is 
both normatively relevant and often glossed over in debates about specific normative issues. I hope 
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my discussion of Altman and Wellman has not only illustrated these points, but might also be of 
constructive use in further debates about territory, immigration, and the state.
 52
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